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INTRODUCTION
In an earlier article we described how the National Highway
Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) was established to force
the design of safer automobiles through the promulgation of na-
tional safety performance standards.' By the mid-1970s, however,
it had become a consumer complaint bureau whose massive recall
activities had no discernable effect on motor vehicle safety. We at-
tributed NHTSA's shift in regulatory strategy to the external legal
culture. In particular, the agency had adjusted to a proceduralized
form of judicial review that had burdened, dislocated, and ulti-
mately paralyzed its rule making efforts. By contrast, the judiciary
reacted so favorably to NHTSA's recall efforts that manufacturers
soon viewed legal resistance to recalls as counterproductive.
Anyone who has a nodding acquaintance with bureaucracies
and their internal atmospheres will view this straightforward story
of agency adjustment to external legal control with considerable
skepticism. Bureaucratic behavior is also determined by internal
factors such as office organization, established routines, resource
allocations, professional cadres, and unique leaders. To look inside
a bureaucracy, moreover, is to explore institutional personal-
ity-the sense of mission, morale, indeed the culture, that guides
the day to day activities of a bureaucracy's functionaries. Bureau-
cratic institutions have their own internal laws, expressed both in
regulation and in routine.
t Jerry L. Mashaw is the William Nelson Cromwell Professor of Law and Professor,
Institute for Social Policy Studies, Yale University. David L. Harfst practices with the firm
of Covington and Burling and is a visiting Lecturer in Law at Yale Law School. A different
version of this article will appear as Chapter Nine in The Struggle for Auto Safety. (forth-
coming, Harvard 1990).
Jerry L. Mashaw and David L. Harfst, Regulation and Legal Culture: The Case of
Motor Vehicle Safety, 4 Yale J Reg 257 (1987).
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The repercussions within an agency of the legal culture's rejec-
tion or validation of the agency's outputs are always uncertain. Ex-
ternal legal controllers often cannot know or comprehend an
agency's internal laws, not to mention its organizational culture.
Yet these internal factors determine the meaning and effect of
blunt legal signals such as "affirmed," "reversed," and "re-
manded." Analysts of the impact of legal commands on agency
performance, therefore, often find tales of unexpected conse-
quences,' irony,3 and dysfunction. 4 They sometimes find that the
law has no effect at all on bureaucratic behavior.5 Indeed, courts
frustrated by the ineffectiveness of legal directives often try their
own hand at reorienting agencies' internal laws, cultures, and
personnel.
Such stories suggest that organizational cultures are internally
resilient; that is, that they are highly resistant to external threats
and manipulation. Or, perhaps more accurately, these stories sug-
gest that the relatively intractable internal cultures of organiza-
tions will divert external controls into bureaucratic channels, or
translate them into organizational instructions, that produce re-
sults far different from the results intended.
We, too, are fascinated by the tales of illusory, ironic, and un-
expected effects of the law's attempts to control administrative ac-
tion, but our findings concerning the National Highway Traffic
Safety Administration are not of that genre. The external legal
culture's ready validation of recalls, combined with its grudging
and limited legitimation of rulemaking, operated in the intended
directions. Over time the agency reorganized its internal culture to
reflect the demands of external legal controllers. While the results
are perverse from the standpoint of the safety goals of the 1966
2 See, for example, Jerry L. Mashaw, Bureaucratic Justice 187-88 (Yale, 1983).
3 See, for example, R. Shep Melnick, Regulation and the Courts 344-45 (Brookings,
1983).
See, for example, Ralph K. Winter, Jr., Judicial Review of Agency Decisions: The
Labor Board and the Court, 1968 S Ct Rev 53.
' See, for example, Jerry L. Mashaw, et al, Social Security Hearings and Appeals 125-
50 (Lexington, 1978); Martin Shapiro, The Supreme Court and Administrative Agencies
196-200 (Free Press, 1968).
6 See Owen M. Fiss and Doug Rendleman, Injunctions (Foundation, 2d ed 1984); Note,
Eliminating the Continuing Effects of the Violation: Compensatory Education as a Rem-
edy for Unlawful School Segregation, 97 Yale L J 1173 (1988).
Nor are the more general, statistical findings of our colleagues Donald Elliot and Pe-
ter Schuck. They report that a large proportion of judicial remands to administrative agen-
cies produce policy changes that the parties seeking judicial review believe to be responsive
to their concerns. See Donald Elliott and Peter Schuck, To the Chevron Station: An Empir-
ical Study of Federal Administrative Law, 1990 Duke L J xx (forthcoming June 1990).
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Motor Vehicle Safety Act,8 the striking feature of the NHTSA
story is the extreme malleability of the agency's internal culture.
The regulatory activity and organizational change inside NHTSA
during the crucial years of its strategic shift from rules to recalls
thus suggest the fragility of at least some organizational cultures
when pressured, even mildly, by the external legal environment.
I. ORGANIZATIONAL FATE
In a mid-1970s portrait,9 Charles Pruitt described NHTSA as
committed to remaking the motor vehicle through the issuance of
motor vehicle safety standards. In Pruitt's view, this stance was
"an inevitable . . . product of the way in which the agency ha[d]
been staffed, organized and led."'10 At the time of his research, in
the mid-1970s, engineers held virtually all key posts in the agency.
Its preference for motor vehicle standard-setting over alternative
regulatory strategies (for example, highway redesign or the modifi-
cation of driver behavior) simply reflected "the task [that engi-
neers] do best."" Pruitt portrayed NHTSA as an agency that had
been "captured" by its safety engineers.
Pruitt's depiction was truly an inside portrait. He relied heav-
ily on the perceptions of personnel within the agency, and there is
no reason to believe that his informants were either systematically
misled by key agency officials or less than candid about the "feel"
of the agency's internal culture. Yet even at the time Pruitt wrote?
the agency's rulemaking years were already behind it. Ninety per-
cent of its total rulemaking output occurred prior to 1974.12 In-
deed, none of its current safety rules was first issued after 1976.
How could an agency organized and staffed as Pruitt describes
thereafter fail almost completely to promulgate any new vehicle
safety rules?
The answer is that NHTSA had been and was changing rap-
idly. Michael Finkelstein, Associate Administrator for Rulemaking,
" The most methodologically sophisticated study of the effects of NHTSA's safety rules
estimated that they reduce fatalities and severe injuries by twenty to thirty percent. See
Robert W. Crandall, et al, Regulating the Automobile 55, 69 (Brookings, 1986). Recalls, by
contrast, have no known effects on motor vehicle safety. See discussion in Mashaw and
Harfst, 4 Yale J Reg at 313 (cited in note 1).
9 Charles Pruitt, People Doing What They Do Best: The Professional Engineers and
NHTSA, 39 Pub Admin Rev 363 (1979).
10 Id at 363.
1Id at 370.
12 49 CFR §§ 571.100-571. 126, 571.200-571. 222, 571.301-571. 302 (1989); US Dept of
Transportation, Motor Vehicle Safety 1978 32-34 (NHTSA annual report).
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indicated how far and how fast the agency had come in a 1980
memorandum to his rulemaking staff, entitled "Why I Am Losing
My Hair.' 1 3 That memorandum was pitched in light-hearted tones,
but its message was serious and unmistakable: the guard had
changed, permanently. Finkelstein got straight to the point:
To insure that intelligent regulations are issued, we must
take advantage of all the talent in NHTSA and work with our
colleagues, particularly those in OCC [Office of the Chief
Counsel] and P & P [Plans and Programs]. Moreover, neither
OCC nor P & P are expected to provide automatic endorse-
ments of our work, but must independently examine our pro-
posals ....
Many of you (and I will admit that it hits me occasionally
as well) believe that P & P and OCC exist to harass us. That
they are not cooperating to meet deadlines. That they contin-
ually raise issues that are without merit or fail to understand
our analysis. I don't agree. 4
After reviewing the situation in detail (Finkelstein described
the office as "festering" with an "undercurrent of discontent"), he
announced new procedures to force the rulemakers to respond to
the objections raised by lawyers and analysts.' 5 Finkelstein then
concluded in tones that were both conciliatory and ominous:
I know that it is annoying to see documents that are ac-
ceptable to us-or are as good as we can produce under a
tight deadline-seemingly being picked to death by others at
their leisure.
I do not for a moment believe that we are always wrong
and P & P or OCC is always right. However, there is little
that we can do to correct them. I think that it will be far more
productive to concentrate on eliminating some of the reasons
for complaints, warranted or unwarranted.
6
Finkelstein's memorandum was but one example of the defen-
sive organizational strategy that had given the cost-benefit analysts
and lawyers in P & P and OCC as great a role in passing (and
stalling) motor vehicle standards as the rulemaking [RM] staff. As
the frustrations of Finkelstein's staff attest, that new structure ef-
'1 Memorandum from Associate Administrator for Rulemaking to All Rulemaking Staff
(February 1, 1980) (on file with authors).
1 Id at 1.
15 Id at 3.
'6 Id at 4.
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fectively checked the engineers' rulemaking bias. Indeed, the Fin-
kelstein memo reflected many changes in NHTSA's internal
processes and personnel over the decade of the 1970s-changes
that had transformed the agency's internal power structure.
Within those ten years the engineering-rulemaking dominance that
Pruitt identified gave way to a lawyer/economist-recall dominance.
Putting the story this boldly suggests that professional warfare
within NHTSA caused the shift from rules to recalls. From the
inside, it may have looked that way. The professional culture of
the engineers did clash with that of the lawyers and economists,
and professional orientation may have motivated or guided the
combatants. Yet this is an enormously incomplete account of why
the agency's regulatory technique changed. For we need to know
not only that lawyers and economists were in conflict with engi-
neers-a conflict that may have been a natural outgrowth of their
differing professional orientations-but also why the former groups
seem to have triumphed. Even if we know that professional orien-
tation "drove" or motivated the actors, we still need to explain
why the economists and lawyers were ultimately successful. What
were the rules that governed the competition? And how did those
rules-reflected in the agency's staffing and organization-emerge?
Our thesis, of course, is that the environment, particularly the
legal culture, selects the winner in a struggle for survival or preem-
inence. Lawyers and economists are not inherently better endowed
than engineers for survival or preeminence in regulatory settings.
Indeed, when safety engineering is the job at hand, one would im-
agine just the opposite to be true. Nor were other factors that pro-
mote organizational success-agency structure, decision routines,
or budgetary resources-fixed during NHTSA's early years in ways
that systematically disadvantaged the engineers. Indeed, quite the
contrary. Otherwise Pruitt's finding of the initial preeminence of
engineers would have been inconceivable.
Something in the agency's regulatory environment must have
exalted one group over the other. Recognizing, of course, that this
preeminence may have been reflected, strengthened, and, in the
short run, maintained, by resource allocations and structural fea-
tures within and controlled by the agency, we believe that "some-
thing" to be the law.
We are not saying that this shift in regulatory tactics can be
explained simply as the result of interaction between professional
culture and legal constraint. Indeed, put this way, "professional
culture" and "legal constraint" are caricatures. At the very least, a
professional's moral commitments, individual personality, and or-
1990]
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ganizational role shape his conduct. To know that a person is a
lawyer or an economist is not to predict his behavior. And the dic-
tates of the law or legal culture are not translated immutably into
the bureaucratic constraints and empowerments that actually de-
termine an actor's success.
It is therefore both fundamentally correct and hopelessly in-
complete to say that NHTSA's shift from rules to recalls signalled
the triumph of lawyers and economists over safety engineers in a
multi-year struggle mediated by the external legal culture's evalua-
tion of their respective efforts. Professional cultures, bureaucratic
roles, individual personalities, agency structures and decision
processes, judicial review, congressional oversight, amendment of
statutes and regulations, appropriations, executive branch require-
ments, and a host of other factors (including chance) contributed
to that ultimate result. Yet a more detailed look at the events in-
side NHTSA during the 1970s reveals the singular importance of
the law in empowering bureaucratic actors and establishing
NHTSA's internal standards of success and failure.
II. ENGINEERS IN CONTROL
A. The Rise of the Office of Motor Vehicle Programs (MVP)
In 1971, Robert Lee Carter, age forty-four, became acting As-
sociate Administrator for Motor Vehicle Programs. Carter's profes-
sional background perfectly suited him to the task of managing the
auto safety program that Congress had envisioned in 1966. He had
done postgraduate work in human factors engineering at Ohio
State University from 1951 to 1953, and worked on aeronautical
crashworthiness programs at North American Rockwell for more
than a decade. He joined the agency in 1967, as Director of Crash
Survivability Research, and in that capacity developed an early
and passionate commitment to the airbag.
In many respects, the then-administrator, Douglas Toms, was
Carter's perfect foil. Toms knew relatively little about automotive
engineering and seemed more comfortable with the Highway
Safety Act side of NHTSA's operations. He was delighted to dele-
gate responsibility to his deputies. Indeed, delegation soon became
a matter of necessity, as his frequent visits to regional offices, at-
tendance at conferences on auto safety, and other out-of-town en-
gagements earned Toms a reputation as Administrator-in-
Absentia.
Carter, an ambitious, tough-minded manager with shrewd bu-
reaucratic instincts and little tolerance for sharing power, set about
[57:443
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the task of filling this void. One agency colleague remembered
Carter as "very dominating," a figure who "controlled information"
and "couldn't tolerate disagreement."' 7 Another senior staffer
stated simply that "you either got along with Bob or you were not
there."
The spare administrative structure at NHTSA favored
Carter's ascendancy. The agency's few divisions-Motor Vehicle
Programs (MVP), Research and Development (R & D), and Trans-
portation Safety Programs (TSP)-and congressional limits on hir-
ing supergrade personnel meant that Carter had few rivals inside
the agency to challenge his control over both the rulemaking and
recall programs. Carter's authority was formalized in November
1972 by an internal directive, the 800-1 Order,' which vested vir-
tually all important rulemaking activities in MVP. Under Order
800-1, MVP had initial responsibility for analyzing not only engi-
neering aspects of the rules, but also production lead times and
economic impacts, costs and benefits, expected industry and public
reaction-even legal and political issues. MVP had ultimate deci-
sional authority as well. After MVP engineers prepared a "prelimi-
nary review paper" summarizing a proposed action, other offices
could only "comment" on the proposal within a strict timetable.
The 800-1 Order gave MVP explicit authority to adopt or reject
the comments of other offices when seeking the Administrator's
"concurrence" to initiate rulemaking.
Once a decision was made to go forward with a rule, the pro-
posal had to survive review by an evaluation panel. But MVP pre-
pared the technical documents for the panel, such as the "engi-
neering position paper," and, although composed of
representatives from all of NHTSA's major organizational ele-
ments, seven of the thirteen review panel members were from
MVP. An MVP representative served as chair.
The 800-1 Order was more than a statement of aspirations. It
implemented a regulatory process that was in fact tightly con-
trolled by the engineers within NHTSA. Carter and his colleagues
in MVP determined which rulemaking initiatives would go forward
and which would not. Carter's top priority was Standard 208,
which would require occupant passive restraint systems, airbags in
particular; that rulemaking effort consumed the lion's share of
17 The authors interviewed approximately forty current or former agency officials be-
tween December 1980 and June 1987. Notes and other interview materials are on file with
the authors.
11 NHTSA, Order 800-1 (November 7, 1972) (on file with authors).
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agency resources. Inside NHTSA, some murmured that MVP's
commitment to the airbag was beginning to resemble a crusade.
Carter was nicknamed "Associate Administrator for MVSS [Motor
Vehicle Safety Standard] 208," and critics claimed that Carter had
lured Administrator Toms into thinking that the airbag would
"make him famous."'19 Even strong safety advocates, such as Ralph
Nader, complained that NHTSA was losing its perspective on pas-
sive restraints, and that it was neglecting or compromising on re-
calls to secure manufacturer cooperation on Standard 208.20 This
emphasis seemed unlikely to change. In October 1971, MVP re-
leased a general Rulemaking Plan whose central feature was the
integration of most safety rules into a single crashworthiness
superstandard, built around Standard 208.
Early engineering dominance thus comports with Pruitt's find-
ings. But Pruitt failed to note the close alignment between the en-
gineers' professional culture and legislative intent. The engineers'
preference for imposing technology-forcing safety standards con-
formed with the congressional vision of NHTSA as an expert
agency guided by the new science of accidents. The legislative his-
tory of the Motor Vehicle Safety Act indicated strong congres-
sional support for the use of "passive" public health interventions,
such as the airbag.21 Carter's professional preoccupation focused on
precisely the kind of device that Congress had in mind when it
revolutionized the national approach to motor vehicle safety. If en-
gineers had "captured" NHTSA for the purpose of promoting such
devices, it was Congress that had ordered the assault.-2
Pruitt's sketch, however, missed an even more important di-
mension of life inside the agency. He portrayed engineers as part
of a "homogeneous" community whose shared norms bound mem-
bers to a common course of action, whatever their organizational
affiliation within the agency. Somehow, Pruitt overlooked the
19 Personal interview with Frank Berndt (June 2, 1987).
20 Nominations-June, Hearings Before the Senate Committee on Commerce, John W.
Snow, to be Administrator, NHTSA, 94th Cong, 2d Sess 85 (1976) ("Snow Nomination
Hearings") (Nader criticizing Administrator Toms for having "put all his eggs in one basket
here, the air bag, and avoided paying much attention to other safety standards").
21 National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966, 15 USC §§ 1381-1431 (1982 &
Supp 1989). See, for example, HR Rep No 1776, 89th Cong, 2d Sess 10 (1966) (urging adop-
tion of measures to make motor vehicles more crashworthy); and 5 Rep No 1301, 89th Cong,
2d Sess 3 (1966) (citing "Graphic Evidence" that vehicle interiors can be reconfigured to
enhance occupant protection).
22 For a critique of Pruitt's analysis, see Leon S. Robertson, The National Highway
Traffic Safety Administration: Evidence Contrary to Pruitt's Characterizations, 40 Pub
Admin Rev 294 (1980).
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abundant evidence that different groups of engineers were, in fact,
at war with each other, and that conflict along internal organiza-
tional lines hampered the issuance of innovative safety rules. In-
creasingly, that conflict explained the gulf between Carter's state
of the art aspirations and the mundane reality of NHTSA's actual
rules.
B. MVPvs. R&D
Gene Mannella, age forty-one, joined NHTSA in late 1972 as
Associate Administrator for R & D. His prior career included posi-
tions as Director of Technology at NASA's Electronics Research
Center and Dean of the School of Architecture and Engineering at
Catholic University. He found that NHTSA was a "rudderless"
agency and that the R & D Office in particular was in a "state of
disarray. ' 23 He perceived only one genuine leader at NHTSA: Bob
Carter. MVP was a "well-knit organization" with an extensive and
vigorous external constituency: private companies seeking to mar-
ket the airbag, the insurance industry, Nader's public interest
groups, and Senator Hartke (One of the earliest and most ardent
supporters of the auto safety program in congress) and his staff,
among others. No other division within the agency enjoyed such
support, and Carter adroitly used his contacts outside NHTSA to
preserve and extend his authority within. Mannella was impressed
that only Carter seemed to know what would happen at the in-
creasingly frequent and contentious congressional hearings, and ac-
cordingly, that only he knew how to prepare for them.
Despite this unsettling state of affairs, Mannella found that he
had arrived at an auspicious time. Belatedly fulfilling Congress's
commitment to provide NHTSA with a research arm, the appro-
priations committees were hurling bodies and dollars at the R & D
Office,24 while growth in the other agency divisions stood still. Con-
gress clearly wanted the research office to play a more important
role.
But R & D's influence was not likely to increase unopposed.
Tension had been building within NHTSA for months over the
control of the research program, and with Mannella's arrival, this
struggle burst into open and prolonged conflict. The central issue
was whether MVP had veto power over research projects and had
"3 Personal interview with Gene G. Mannella (June 19, 1987).
14 See, for example, US Dept of Transportation, Motor Vehicle Safety 1980 Appendix
B (NHTSA annual report) (showing increase in personal strengths allocated to research and
analysis from 118 in Fiscal Year 1971 to 174 in Fiscal Year 1972).
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to "sign off" on proposed R & D programs. The battle lines were
clearly drawn. Carter considered research to be a rulemaking sup-
port function; R & D was to act as an adjunct of MVP. Mannella
strongly disagreed. He believed that the R & D Office had to be
autonomous in order to independently appraise auto safety
programs.
Three circuit courts of appeals issued decisions in 1972 sup-
porting Mannella's position. In each case, the circuit court sent the
agency back to the drawing board to further research and develop
its proposals.25 The courts' displeasure with NHTSA's work prod-
uct suggested that the agency had failed to undertake adequate,
objective technological scrutiny, and that rulemakings needed to
be supported by independent appraisals of research.2" The agency's
position in court would be strengthened by independent appraisal
of research providing the empirical basis for particular regulations.
Carter was surely correct that the R & D program was meant to
support rulemaking. But an organizational form that made R & D
subservient to the rulemaking organization would not promote the
agency's goal of effective safety regulation. As Mannella argued,
MVP needed to be protected from its own enthusiasm. Both sides
had good points. The result was organizational stalemate.
As the months wore on, reports of trench warfare inside
NHTSA filtered to the congressional committees. At Senate over-
sight hearings in 1972, officials of the Public Interest Research
Group (Clarence Ditlow and Carl Nash) reported that safety stan-
dards seemed to be "almost completely devoid of input from
NHTSA's Research Institute (an arm of the research office) which
has spent tens of millions of dollars on motor vehicle research and
the experimental safety vehicle program. 2 7 "[O]ne gets the dis-
tinct impression when one looks at new proposed rulemaking,"
Nash continued, "that nobody at NHTSA who is involved in the
promulgation of standards actually reviews the research that has
been done by the agency."2 8
" The cases were H & H Tire Co. v Dept. of Transportation, 471 F2d 350 (7th Cir
1972); Chrysler Corp. v Dept. of Transportation, 472 F2d 659 (6th Cir 1972); and Wagner
Electric Corp. v Volpe, 466 F2d 1013 (3d Cir 1972). For an extended discussion of these
cases, see Mashaw and Harfst, 4 Yale J Reg at 279-86 (cited in note 1).
2 Indeed, these decisions were so interpreted by the agency. See Motor Vehicle Safety
Oversight, Hearings Before the Senate Committee on Commerce, 93d Cong, 2d Sess 84, 109-
10 (1974) (statement of Lawrence Schneider, Chief Counsel, NHTSA).
27 National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Authorization Act of 1972, Hearings on S
3474 Before the Senate Committee on Commerce, 92d Cong, 2d Sess 69 (1972) ("Hearings
on S 3474").
28 Id at 72.
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In January 1973, Senator Magnuson, Chairman of the Com-
merce Committee, demanded an investigation. The General Ac-
counting Office (GAO) issued its report fifteen months later.2 9 In
part, the GAO reported, the breakdown between the offices
stemmed from the different professional orientations of the two
sides. Researchers approached projects "analytically," "whereas
the MVP office believed that sufficient analytical data was availa-
ble to develop structures for testing and thereby start with a more
advanced phase of research." 30 Rulemakers were driven by sched-
ules and were impatient with vague research findings that gener-
ated further questions and delayed regulatory implementation.
Consequently, they tended to ignore R & D reports. Researchers,
by contrast, were free of deadline pressures and tended to adopt
the ethic of the independent research contractors' employees, with
whom they had more frequent contact and who shared their joy of
research for its own sake. Indeed, NHTSA's reliance on contract
research greatly magnified its problems. After reviewing a sample
of twelve research projects under contract, GAO reported that
"[m]ost of the contractors' final reports included a recommenda-
tion that further work be done to confirm research conclusions."'"
According to the picture painted by GAO, rulemakers were
lucky to get any research done on their priority initiatives. Ineffec-
tive communication and professional and personal preferences sent
researchers on frolics of their own that seemed to lead anywhere
but the rulemaking docket. No one, it seemed, insisted on coordi-
nation. The researchers were never satisfied; the rulemakers lacked
sufficient data to withstand judicial review. Regulation stagnated.
C. Opening the Complaints Bureau
As rulemaking conflict continued both inside and outside the
agency, the Toms era at NHTSA drew to a close. On March 30,
1973, his last day in office, Toms granted an interview to the New
York Times to review his accomplishments and "wax nostalgic. "32
Toms was proudest, he said, of the creation of NHTSA as a sepa-
rate agency, which had given regulators "the independence to deal
with Congress and the lobby groups" and was "his most significant
29 General Accounting Office, Improvements Needed in Planning and Using Motor Ve-
hicle Safety Research (September 16, 1974).
30 Id.
31 Id.
3 2 Departing Traffic Safety Chief Says It's Hard to Find Successor in "Hot Seat," NY
Times 29 (April 2, 1973).
1990]
HeinOnline -- 57 U. Chi. L. Rev.  453 1990
The University of Chicago Law Review
achievement on behalf of traffic safety. 3 Knowledgeable readers
of the Times report were puzzled by this claim. NHTSA's separa-
tion from the Federal Highway Administration had been planned
long before Toms's arrival, and the basic organization of the
agency had changed very little under his supervision. During his
tenure, however, one box was added to the organizational chart
that represented a genuine innovation. The Office of Consumer Af-
fairs and Public Information was created to handle consumer in-
quiries that were flooding the agency. Under Toms, NHTSA took
the first steps toward reconstituting itself as a complaints bureau.
Toms had repeatedly testified to Congress that the lines
outside his office were growing alarmingly long.34 The agency
seemed to get no respite from the swarm of angry consumers who
demanded its help in repairing their broken cars. The market in
safety defect letters was bullish. In 1970, NHTSA received about
5,000 complaints concerning defective automobiles. The following
year, the number doubled. The next year, it nearly doubled again.
Complaints poured in, not only from individual con§umers, but
from insurance companies, Congress, consumer groups, other agen-
cies, and NHTSA's own regional offices. It soon became clear that
the defects operation must be expanded if NHTSA were to have
any hope of answering its mail.
The defects office had been established within MVP in late
1967 as a tiny division of the larger Office of Compliance, whose
principal purpose was to enforce safety standards. Initially, the di-
vision was staffed by only three professionals. Toms, responding to
the flood of incoming mail and to complaints from Congress and
Nader that recall investigations were taking too long, increased the
staff to thirteen engineers and technicians by the end of 1970.
When the demands on the division did not abate, he retrained ad-
ditional staff and gave new organizational stature to the recall ef-
fort. Effective July 1, 1971, the division was removed from the Of-
fice of Standards Enforcement and raised to the status of a
separate office, the Office of Defects Investigation (ODI), within
MVP. By this time, it had a professional staff of 24, about half the
number of professionals in MVP's rulemaking branches.
If rulemaking was a source of internal stress, recalls were an
administrator's delight. To a large extent, defect investigations ran
33 Id.
" Department of Transportation and Related Agencies Appropriations for Fiscal Year
1972, Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee, 92d Cong,
1st Sess, Part 3 at 76 (1971).
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themselves. A study by the staff of the National Product Safety
Commission called the process "largely passive."3 Investigations
proceeded then, as now, through three basic phases: preliminary
inquiry; engineering analysis; and formal investigation. At each
step, the regulatory burdens on NHTSA were much lighter than
those of rulemaking. As one Administrator later remarked "There
was no lack [of] finding [defects] in my term, I mean, they just
came and presented themselves to me."3
NHTSA's senior managers were troubled by one issue, how-
ever, as they transferred personnel and funds to ODI in the early
1970s. The agency could not demonstrate any safety benefits from
the recall program, and repeatedly told Congress so. Administrator
Toms, for example, testified in 1972 that he did not "feel the
payoffs [were] high there. '3 7 Appearing before the House Appro-
priations Committee later that year, Toms reiterated that:
We have always said that we should do what we can to be sure
that the vehicles on the road were safe. We don't want to con-
tribute to a situation where there are defective parts on cars
that could injure or kill people. In the actual analysis of dif-
ferent programs, [however,] the whole defect situation of re-
calling cars does not have the kind of [safety] payoff that
crash survivability of structures has.3
Toms's critique was understated, to say the least. Many inside
NHTSA, especially in MVP, believed that shutting down ODI
would not be a great loss. Robert Lee Carter was foremost among
them.
D. 0CC vs. MVP: The Engineers' Grip Loosens
On Friday afternoon, July 12, 1974, Larry Schneider,
NHTSA's Chief Counsel, suffered a fatal heart attack while play-
ing tennis at East Potomac Park. His death came as a shock to
colleagues in the agency. Schneider was only thirty-six, but he had
become an instrumental figure at the agency, especially in the af-
11 Staff of the National Commission on Product Safety, Federal Consumer Safety Leg-
islation: A Study of the Scope and Adequacy of the Automobile Safety, Flammable
Fabrics, Toys, and Hazardous Substances Programs 76 (GPO, 1970).
28 Remarks of Joan Claybrook, Yale Law School Seminar on Automobile Safety (April
9, 1984) (transcript on file with authors).
37 Hearings on S 3474 at 47 (cited in note 27).
38 Department of Transportation and Related Agencies Appropriations for Fiscal Year
1973, Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee, 92d Cong,
2d Sess, Part 1 943 (1972).
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termath of the 1974 recall amendments, which greatly increased
the agency's investigatory powers and provided for increased fines
and penalties against manufacturers. Schneider had personally
steered the bill through Congress and was eulogized by Senator
Magnuson as a "moving force in legislation to strengthen the auto
safety recall provisions."3 9 Moreover, because Schneider took a
cautious legal position on rulemaking, 40 his career as Chief Counsel
seemed to epitomize a new and more "successful" direction at the
agency.
Inside NHTSA, the legal staff had won significant gains in
prestige and influence during the years that Schneider had pre-
sided as Chief Counsel. Between 1971 and 1974, the workload of
the Office of the Chief Counsel (OCC) had tripled, partly because
of the "phenomenal" increase in litigation.4' The Chief Counsel be-
came the number two man-behind the Deputy Administrator-in
the Administrator's absence. Indeed, in three years, OCC had leap-
frogged every other office in the agency hierarchy.
4 2
The ultimate choice for Schneider's successor, Frank Berndt,
reflected the repositioning of the agency to take up the enforce-
ment tasks set out in the 1974 recall amendments. The new Chief
Counsel had been NHTSA's first enforcement attorney and its
most ardent internal advocate for an aggressive recall program. For
Bob Carter, Berndt's appointment was hardly welcome news. Ten-
sion between Carter and Berndt had long existed concerning the
direction, importance, and control of recalls. Berndt had continu-
ally pressed Schneider to convince the Administrator to tighten
OCC control over defect investigations. It now appeared that
Berndt would be in a position to lobby even more aggressively for
this control. To Carter, Berndt was a recall "zealot," relentlessly
promoting a recall program whose effects were superfluous at
best.4"
Berndt, in turn, regarded Carter as a devious autocrat who
"wanted to control everything" and did not take the enforcement
11 Morton Mintz, Safety Advocate Won Cases Against Car Makers, Wash Post D4
(July 13, 1974).
40 See note 26.
Department of Transportation and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1974, Hear-
ings Before a Subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee, 93d Cong, 1st Sess,
Part 3 174 (1973) (statement of Chief Counsel Schneider).
42 Compare 49 CFR § 501.4 (1972) (naming Chief Counsel seventh official in line of
succession) with 49 CFR § 501.4 (1974) (naming Chief Counsel second in line of succession).
"' Personal Interview with Robert L. Carter (June 9, 1987).
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program "seriously."'44 Berndt believed that Carter was sacrificing
recalls to Standard 208, and was furious that Carter had placed the
Office of Defects Investigations under the control of a supervisor
(Andrew "No Defect" Detrick, as he was known in OCC) who
"didn't really believe in the program." Berndt believed that the
engineers and technicians in ODI "didn't know how to investigate
cases" and had "pro-industry" leanings.
As the 1970s wore on, the bickering between lawyers and engi-
neers grew steadily worse during the panel meetings that were held
to determine whether an "engineering analysis" should proceed to
a full-fledged investigation of a defect. The lawyers felt that the
engineers in ODI were not sufficiently zealous or competent. The
engineers in ODI felt that the lawyers did not understand engi-
neering problems. Berndt and his deputies usually wanted to go
forward with investigations. The engineers were more "conserva-
tive" and often favored closing the file. They reasoned that if
NHTSA had no data establishing that injuries or deaths had oc-
curred (as was often the case), the agency should not press for a
recall simply because there were a large number of failures in a
vehicle component. After all, the statute only provided for recalls
to remedy defects that presented an "unreasonable risk" of
injury.
45
The lawyers were contemptuous of this position. Berndt be-
lieved the issue was whether NHTSA could win in court. The stat-
ute did not require NHTSA to prove that deaths and injuries had
occurred or would occur and Berndt was determined that the
agency not take upon itself such an onerous burden of proof. The
long line of losses in rulemaking cases showed where that would
lead. Berndt refused even to issue a regulatory definition of the
term "defect" on the ground that "the relatively broad definition
of defect contained in the Safety Act is best suited to the wide
variety of defective conditions that may arise. "46 The 1966 Act's
definition, however, was little more than a tautology: "[d]efect in-
cludes any defect in performance, construction, components, or
materials in motor vehicles or motor vehicle equipment. ' 47 The
agency's refusal to provide a more meaningful standard thus al-
lowed it to maintain maximum strategic flexibility.
" Personal interview with Frank Berndt (June 4, 1987).
" 15 USC § 1391.
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, Response to Petitions for Reconsid-
eration of Defect Notification Regulations, 38 Fed Reg 9509, 9510 (April 17, 1973).
"' 15 USC § 1391.
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Of course, an operational definition was necessary for decision-
making purposes. Berndt discussed the matter with colleagues, in-
cluding a former employee of the Antitrust Division of the Justice
Department. These discussions led Berndt to conclude that, under
the statute, any malfunction of a safety-related component (for ex-
ample, wheels, brakes, or lights) could be treated as a defect "per
se," much as certain practices, like price fixing, are deemed an-
ticompetitive under antitrust law without a showing of actual harm
to competitors. Berndt believed that if the agency could establish
that a safety-related component failed in a "disproportionate"
number of cars, the burden of proof should shift to the manufac-
turer to show that accident or injury would not result.48
Carter and Berndt were speaking different languages, and
neither showed any interest in gaining fluency in the idiom of the
other. By late 1973, Carter had grown weary of the feud with
Berndt over recall policy. To break the impasse, Carter expressed a
willingness to litigate test cases in order to resolve intra-agency
differences through judicial clarification of the statute. The courts
responded between 1975 and 1977.19 Berndt's per se theory tri-
umphed to a degree that may have exceeded even his expectations.
The courts ruled that recalls could be ordered on the basis of evi-
dence that would have been laughed out of court if offered as sup-
port for a motor vehicle standard. The recall program was a legal
success story, whereas rulemaking had been largely a legal fiasco.
III. GREGORY TAKES CHARGE
James B. Gregory was Administrator during .the crucial years
of OCC/MVP competition. Beyond being a licensed driver, Greg-
ory, age forty-eight, had no identifiable ties with auto safety. He
was exceedingly uncomfortable with the feuding among the senior
staff, but, lacking substantive background, avoided deciding be-
tween the contestants. Indeed, rather than resolving the Carter-
Mannella conflict, Gregory institutionalized it. Weary of a deci-
sionmaking process that produced much information but few deci-
sions, Gregory determined in 1974 to resolve the deadlock by
transferring the research office to MVP. Associate Administrator
Mannella promptly threatened to resign. The Administrator
dropped the plan.
'8 Briefing Materials, Prepared by NHTSA Office of Chief counsel (undated) (on file
with authors).
"' See Mashaw and Harfst, 4 Yale J Reg at 299-302 (cited in note 1).
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Instead, minor procedural and organizational changes were
adopted that required MVP and R & D to "concur" in research
plans. The goal was to force reconciliation within a fixed timetable
and refer irreconcilable differences to the Administrator for resolu-
tion. The new procedures produced much referral and little recon-
ciliation. Caught between senior advisors at war among themselves,
and buffeted on all sides by the conflicting demands of auto manu-
facturers, consumer groups, their respective allies in Congress, and
others, Gregory groped for a course that would find "public accept-
ance." But this quest sent Gregory down a lonely, treacherous path
that led, ultimately, to his resignation.
A. Standard 208
Many of the technical uncertainties surrounding the airbag
were resolved well before or during the early part of Gregory's
term in office. In the months following the Sixth Circuit's 1972 re-
jection of the first airbag rule,50 NHTSA and its contractors
watched attentively as a series of vehicles occupied by baboons,
cadavers, and instrumented mannequins smashed into fixed barri-
ers at various speeds. The test results made it reasonably clear that
the most frequently voiced technical objections to the
airbag-danger to out-of-position occupants, inadvertent actua-
tion, toxicity of the propellent, and the like-did not warrant seri-
ous concern. Most observers agreed: the airbag worked.5'
The focus shifted to the costs and benefits of airbags. The
agency's own figures indicated that full front seat protection from
airbags would save $4.4 billion annually in auto accident expendi-
tures, and that the benefits could exceed the costs by more than
two to one.52 But Gregory was leery. The manufacturers, of course,
had produced quite different cost-benefit figures.
More important, the mail from angry ignition interlock cus-
tomers had poured into NHTSA during Gregory's first days in of-
fice and convinced him, as he later said, that there was something
uniquely "personal" about auto safety regulation.53 Would "ra-
tional" consumers be willing to pay the incremental costs of full
Chrysler Corp. v DOT, 472 F2d 659.
51 Id.
52 Untitled and Undated Memorandum by Administrator James Gregory (on file with
authors).
11 Regulatory Reform-Vol 4, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Oversight and In-
vestigations of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 94th Cong, 2d
Sess 363-64 (1976). See text at note 59-60 for discussion of the ignition interlock episode.
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airbag protection? Gregory was not sure. Although the airbag con-
troversy had been thoroughly aired in the press and had aroused
much interest, the absence of support from individual consumers
made the Administrator edgy. Testifying before Congress in 1976,
Gregory remarked that he had "not yet received one letter that [he
could] think of, from an individual citizen who thinks much of the
airbag.54 He told Congress that "[m]any good ideas, if not thor-
oughly looked at, and thoroughly planned, can be shot down
through lack of public acceptance" and that "public involvement
and acceptance ... is something that we must keep in mind during
the preparation for new programs, or we will not succeed.""
These were not necessarily the statements of a timid or indeci-
sive administrator. Events following the 1972 Chrysler decision,56
which invalidated major portions of the agency's passive restraints
rule, had enshrined "public acceptance" as a legal criterion for
NHTSA's standard-setting, both as a practical and a formal mat-
ter. In Chrysler, the Sixth Circuit remanded certain of the passive
restraint requirements of Standard 208 for the development of
"objective" criteria against which to measure compliance with
those requirements. But the remand did not invalidate all of Stan-
dard 208. In effect, it left one compliance option, which thus be-
came mandatory-connecting existing seat and shoulder belts to
an ignition interlock that would prevent drivers from starting their
cars unless their seatbelts were engaged. This device was not only
feasible with existing technology, it was cheap. It promised a mas-
sive increase in seatbelt usage at virtually no increase in financial
cost. The interlock requirement therefore remained in effect pend-
ing revision of Standard 208's passive restraints requirement. 7
The interlock did not survive long in the marketplace, how-
ever. First attached to model year 1974 vehicles, the interlocks
generated hate mail to Congress reminiscent of the deluge follow-
ing Richard Nixon's removal of Archibald Cox as Special Prosecu-
tor. By August 1974, Congress had repealed the interlock require-
ment, forbidden its readoption, and attached a legislative veto to
any reissuance of Standard 208.58 Moreover, NHTSA's own studies
revealed that within nine months of the first appearance of the in-
"4 Id at 465-66.
" Id at 466.
Chrysler Corp. v DOT, 472 F2d 659.
' The interlock even survived judicial review. Ford Motor Co. v NHTSA, 473 F2d 1241
(6th Cir 1973).
51 Motor Vehicle and Schoolbus Safety Amendments of 1974, §109 Pub L No 93-492, 88
Stat 1470, 1482-83 (1974), codified as amended at 15 USC § 1410(b) (1982).
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terlock in American automobiles, nearly half of them had been "il-
legally" disconnected. "Public acceptance" thus had both a techno-
logical and a political component. Consumers could defeat safety
rules with either screwdrivers or political mobilization. While dis-
arming airbag sensors might be beyond the mechanical expertise of
most motorists, consumers could induce a congressional veto of re-
vised Standard 208 with postcards.
To gauge public sentiment on the airbag and break the dead-
lock inside NHTSA, Gregory convened a public hearing on May
23, 1975. The Administrator had promised to issue a final rule that
year and the large turnout reflected the participants' concern that
this could be their last opportunity to influence the outcome. More
than 300 people milled about the hearing room. Some fifty speak-
ers, representing the automotive industry, insurance companies,
equipment suppliers, consumer groups, and public and political
sectors expressed their views-views that staked out every conceiv-
able position on the issue.
The contradictory testimony at the May hearing obviously did
not provide a way out of the- impasse inside NHTSA, and Gregory
soon despaired of finding a consensus outside the agency. "[I]n a
regulating area such as ours," he later said, "there is no 51 percent
majority. As a matter of fact, if I get 12 1/2 percent, I consider it a
landslide." 9 The Administrator had to choose between the fac-
tions. As one agency insider later described it, an "anguished"
Gregory closeted himself in his office to fashion a recommendation
to the Secretary.6
He had reason to be apprehensive. The long-awaited (indeed,
overdue) decision was almost certain to stir controversy. Also, the
recipient of the action memorandum, the Secretary of Transporta-
tion, would not be Gregory's personal friend, Claude Brinegar, but
a recent arrival: William T. Coleman. Coleman, a fifty-four year
old Philadelphia lawyer, long-time Republican party regular, and
civil rights activist, was Harvard-trained and had a recognized ex-
pertise in transportation law. To Gregory, Coleman was another
unknown variable in the Standard 208 equation.
Gregory's action memorandum reflected his uncertainty. He
urged the agency to simultaneously issue two Notices of Proposed
Rulemaking (NPRMs). The first would have promulgated a Stan-
dard under the Highway Safety Act, requiring the states to take
'9 Regulatory Reform Hearings at 433 (cited in note 53).
'o Personal interview with Howard Dugoff, Deputy Administrator under Claybrook
(June 12,1987).
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whatever measures were necessary-for example, mandatory seat
belt use laws (MULs)-to bring seat belt usage to seventy-five per-
cent by January 1, 1980. The second notice would have amended
Standard 208 to require driver passive restraints by September 1,
1979 and full front passive protection two years later. Gregory ar-
gued that time was of the essence and that the notices should be
issued no later than May 1976.
The decision to make two recommendations was strategic. Ei-
ther proposal might run into a political buzz saw and both propos-
als would have to undergo congressional review pursuant to the
1974 Amendments. Indeed, in Gregory's view, that was the beauty
of his proposal, which would resolve the enigma of public accept-
ance. 1 In effect, Gregory urged Secretary Coleman to put the gun
to Congress's head. Congress would be forced to decide what the
public really wanted.
The Secretary and his senior advisors were not impressed.
Some twenty state legislatures had considered but failed to pass
mandatory use legislation, and a proposal was pending in Congress
to rescind NHTSA's authority to impose sanctions on states that
failed to observe the agency's motorcycle helmet traffic safety stan-
dard. Would Congress behave any differently if NHTSA tried to
force reluctant states to pass MULs? Moreover, the Transporta-
tion Department was concerned that the general public would be
enraged by mandatory passive restraints. Because of these con-
cerns, the Assistant Secretary for Systems Development and Tech-
nology sent a memorandum to Secretary Coleman, dated February
26, urging strong opposition to any passive restraint requirement
"at this time. ' 62  The Gregory Proposal was subsequently
abandoned.
B. Standard 121
Gregory was equally frustrated with another rulemaking ef-
fort-that surrounding Standard 121, the large truck braking stan-
dard. The battle over Standard 121 further illustrates NHTSA's
problems with rulemaking and "public acceptance."
" Untitled and Undated Memorandum by Administrator James Gregory (on file with
authors).
2 For an account of NHTSA's handling of Standard 208 from 1969 to 1979, see Na-
tional Transportation Safety Board, Safety Effectiveness Evaluation of the National High-
way Traffic Safety Administration's Rulemaking Process, Vol 2: Case History of Federal
Motor Vehicle Safety Standard 208: Occupant Crash Protection (GPO, 1979).
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Gregory was baffled by the public's attitude toward Standard
121. The purposes of Standard 121 seemed to merit strong popular
support. Air brakes were not designed to protect motorists from
their own folly, after all, but from the folly of others. But Gregory
reported to Congress that "despite editorials fairly late in the
game, [he] could feel practically no public interest" in the matter.6 3
Lack of public support, however, was to be the least of Standard
121's troubles.
Standard 121 was issued in supposedly "final" form on Febru-
ary 19, 1971. It set forth various performance standards for the
braking systems of trucks, buses, and trailers, including stopping
distances at specified speeds on wet and dry surfaces (for example,
245 feet at 60 miles per hour on a dry surface), and a requirement
that vehicles stop within a 12 foot wide lane without more than
momentarily locking any wheel. The standard's effective date was
January 1, 1973.
While the regulated industries opposed many aspects of the
rule, they objected most vociferously to the standard's controver-
sial anti-lock requirement. The standard contemplated (but did
not require) the use of state of the art electronic computer modules
that would sense impending wheel lock-up and automatically ad-
just the air pressure in the brake chamber to maintain the wheels'
rolling action. Eleven vehicle manufacturers, ten brake component
suppliers, and six operator groups filed petitions for reconsidera-
tion. Their most common complaint was that the effective date
could not be met, largely because more time was needed to develop
and test anti-lock devices.
These and other complaints precipitated a seemingly endless
cycle of revisions, new petitions for reconsideration, and new revi-
sions. In 1974, for example, a year after the rule was supposed to
have gone into effect, the agency issued an average of about one
rulemaking notice on Standard 121 every two weeks. In turn, it
received scores of requests for reconsideration. Indeed, between
1972 and 1975, the agency revised virtually every aspect of Stan-
dard 121.64
The flurry of notices, amendments, petitions, re-notices, and
further amendments created a climate of confusion that only
63 Regulatory Reform Hearings at 466 (cited in note 53).
"' For a general account of the agency's handling of Standard 121, see National Trans-
portation Safety Board, Safety Effectiveness Evaluation of the National Highway Traffic
Administration's Rulemaking Process, Vol 1: Case History of Federal Motor Vehicle Safety
Standard 121: Air Brake Systems (GPO, 1979).
1990]
HeinOnline -- 57 U. Chi. L. Rev.  463 1990
The University of Chicago Law Review
strengthened the hand of Standard 121's opponents. The process
seemed endless, and endlessly indecisive. The agency continued to
revise the rule even after it had issued another "final" rule, had
denied petitions to reopen the proceedings, and had been sued by
the PACCAR corporation. The Transportation Secretary's office
thought that the rulemaking process for Standard 121 reflected
poorly on the agency. The endless revisions suggested that
NHTSA was engaged in rulemaking by trial and error. 5
Yet NHTSA's activities with respect to Standard 121 merely
reflected the procedural imperatives that the courts had estab-
lished for the construction of legally defensible rules. The major
judicial review decisions of the late 1960s and early 1970s66 had
instructed the agency to take questions of "practicability" seri-
ously and to respond to the factual submissions of those who op-
posed the agency's proposals. Moreover, the agency could not mod-
ify and reissue its rules to take account of only manufacturers'
objections. Another 1972 decision required it to provide all affected
parties with an opportunity to comment on any significant modifi-
cation of a rulemaking proposal.17 The agency could thus be over-
turned either for failing to respond effectively to the substance of
rulemaking comments or for responding to the substance of com-
ments without providing yet further procedures for further com-
ment by other affected parties. The highly iterative rulemaking
process for Standard 121 reflected the agency's prior experience in
court.
Although the rulemaking process seemed endless, Standard
121 was the end of the line for Gregory. On February 26, 1976,
President Ford publicly released his "Dear Jim" letter accepting
Gregory's resignation "with sincere regret." The Administrator had
privately submitted his notice of resignation a few days earlier. Al-
though some opponents of Standard 121 had allegedly been
spreading rumors of his impending resignation, most observers in-
side NHTSA and elsewhere were surprised by the decision. Greg-
ory categorically denied that he had been asked to resign or had
been fired. "[Y]ou get up one morning and you're worn out," Greg-
" The Secretary's view turned out to parallel that of the Ninth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals. See PACCAR, Inc. v NHTSA, 573 F2d 632, 636-39 (9th Cir 1979).
66 In addition to the cases cited in note 25, see Automotive Parts & Accessories Associ-
ation v Boyd, 407 F2d 330 (DC Cir 1968).
67 Wagner Electric Corp. v Volpe, 466 F2d 1013 (3d Cir 1972).
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ory told a New York Times reporter, "You think maybe it's time
to lay this career to rest.
'68
C. Finding Acceptance
In his March 1 valedictory address to the House Subcommit-
tee on Oversight and Investigations, Gregory indicated that
NHTSA had found "public acceptance" in only one endeavor; pub-
lic participation in defect proceedings was "excellent." The bull
market in consumer complaints had continued. In October 1975,
NHTSA established an experimental toll-free hotline in ten east
coast states to disseminate information on defect investigations
and to gather complaints. As one NHTSA observer later remarked,
it was relatively easy to "set up a consumer hotline and have con-
sumers do your work."69
Meanwhile, the agency continued to tell Congress in budget
submissions that the effect of recalls on vehicle safety "has not
been established.""0 NHTSA's own Advisory Council studied recall
campaigns in 1976 and concluded that: "The question naturally
arises-do the safety benefits of the program justify its cost? Curi-
ously, no one knows. Indeed, the scarcity of hard facts and the
abundance of unknown factors make any definitive evaluation of
the defect-recall program very difficult."'1  NHTSA nonetheless
pressed forward with the recall program and the courts continued
to approve its actions. In fiscal year 1976, the agency announced
plans to transfer sixteen employees to the recall effort. At the same
time, the staff in the principal divisions of the rulemaking office
were reduced by fifteen employees. 72 Bob Carter's grip was
weakening.
IV. MVP (READ, CONGRESS) VS. P & P (READ, THE PRESIDENT)
Transportation Secretary Coleman and his staff were dis-
gusted with the disarray at NHTSA. One senior DOT official dur-
ing this period complained contemptuously that, "The problem is
:" Diane Henry, Conflict Denied by Safety Chief, NY Times 30 (February 28, 1976).
'9 Personal interview with Brian O'Neill (June 11, 1987).
70 Department of Transportation and Related Agencies Appropriations for Fiscal Year
1976, Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee, 94th Cong,
1st Sess, Part 2 200 (1976).
71 Department of Transportation National Motor Vehicle Safety Advisory Council,
Safety Defect Recall Campaigns (DOT, 1976).
71 Department of Transportation and Related Agencies Appropriations for Fiscal Year
1976, Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee, 94th Cong,
1st Sess Part 2 196, 199, 200 (1976).
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that they don't have any checks and balances down there and as a
result everything they do becomes a cause c~l~bre."7 The Secre-
tary and his inner circle concluded that DOT would have to place
NHTSA under tighter, more direct control if the rulemaking pro-
cess was to have any semblance of order. Gregory's departure
presented an ideal opportunity to establish the desired "checks
and balances."
Coleman did not look far for a replacement. On April 21, 1976,
he selected John W. Snow, the DOT Deputy Undersecretary, to
succeed Gregory.74 Snow, age thirty-seven, had a Ph.D. in econom-
ics from the University of Virginia and a J.D. from George Wash-
ington University. He was an expert in economic regulation of the
railroad, aviation, and motor carrier industries, and had joined the
Department as Deputy Assistant General Counsel in 1972. By May
1, 1975, Snow had risen to the position of Deputy Undersecretary
in which capacity he oversaw DOT's "regulatory reform" program.
Snow had only modest experience in safety regulation. His
substantive involvement in automobile safety regulation had been
limited to intermittent participation as a congressional liaison in a
handful of high visibility issues, such as passive restraints and the
ignition interlock. Snow's background, however, suggested his view
of regulation. He taught cost-benefit analysis as a part-time lec-
turer on the economics faculty of the University of Maryland and
represented DOT on the Domestic Council's Regulatory Review
Group, the interagency task force established by President Ford to
coordinate regulatory reform.
Safety partisans were appalled by Snow's appointment and
bore down hard on his "regulatory philosophy" during the Senate
Commerce Committee's nomination hearings on June 26, 1976.
Much of the discussion focused on Snow's commitment to free
market economics and to the appropriate use of cost-benefit analy-
sis in the formulation of auto safety rules. Congress, of course, had
repeatedly refused to enact legislation requiring NHTSA to justify
its auto safety rules on the basis of cost-benefit comparisons.7
From 1974 on, however, the executive branch increasingly
pressured NHTSA to rationalize its standards on precisely those
grounds. On November 27, 1974, President Ford signed Executive
Order 11,821, which directed all executive branch departments to
" Quoted in Pruitt, 39 Pub Admin Rev at 367 (cited in note 9).
7' Alexander Hammer, People and Business, NY Times 53 (April 22, 1976).
7 See, for example, Hearings on HR 13228 before the House Committee on Interstate
and Foreign Commerce, 85th Cong, 2d Sess 269 (1966).
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prepare inflationary impact statements for major rulemaking pro-
posals.7 6 The order was implemented by Office of Management and
Budget Circular A-107, dated January 28, 1975, which directed
each agency to develop procedures for evaluating rules in terms of
quantified costs and benefits whenever possible.
Following these orders, Secretary Coleman issued three "regu-
latory reform" policies on April 13, 1976.8 The first required DOT
to assess the costs, benefits, and other effects of all of its rulemak-
ings prior to issuance either in proposed or final form. The second
policy required agencies within the Department to notify the Sec-
retary thirty days before the proposed publication of any costly or
controversial regulation. The third policy described the Depart-
ment's recently implemented program of determining the actual
costs and benefits of existing regulations.
Without more, Carter and his staff inside NHTSA might have
ignored this blizzard of hortatory paperwork-that was certainly
their inclination. Carter breezily admitted that as late as February
1976, NHTSA used cost-benefit analysis in only a "limited way."
'79
MVP's tiny "cost and lead time" staff responsible for cost-benefit
analysis (six persons in 1975) reflected the relatively low priority
that MVP engineers gave to the effort. But in practical terms,
Carter found it increasingly difficult to remain nonchalant. A new
entity had begun to appear in the agency's rulemaking proceed-
ings-the President's statutorily created Council on Wage and
Price Stability (COWPS)-that was raising hell over NHTSA's
treatment of costs and benefits in rulemaking.80
Following the promulgation of Executive Order 11,821, the
Council had quickly decided to intervene in NHTSA's rulemaking
proceedings on the airbag and the air brake. It filed comments that
were highly critical of NHTSA's proposals. It filed similar submis-
sions during 1975 on proposed amendments to Standard 105 (gov-
erning hydraulic brakes), to proposed cost information reporting
"' Executive Order 11,821, Inflation Impact Statements, 3 CFR 926 (1971-75 comp), 39
Fed Reg 41501 (November 29, 1974).
17 Office of Management and Budget Circular A-107 (January 28, 1975).
78 Department of Transportation, Policies to Improve Analysis and Review of Regula-
tions, 41 Fed Reg 16200-01 (April 16, 1976).
7' Federal Regulation and Regulatory Reform: Report by the Subcommittee on Over-
sight and Investigations of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 94th
Cong, 2d Sess 176 n 72 (1976).
8' Id at 176-77.
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requirements, and to the Uniform Tire Quality Grading
Standard.sl
MVP's cost and lead time staff was no match for the Council
at cost-benefit analysis, and, because COWPS was the President's
personal representative, Council submissions were hard even for
Carter to ignore. Agency officials implied in testimony before Con-
gress in 1976 that they were inclined to "defer" to the Council on
matters of economic analysis. Indeed, under the Automotive
Parts"2 decision, NHTSA was required to make a reasoned, thor-
ough response to the detailed cost-benefit critiques offered by the
Council's staff. Through the interaction of executive branch pres-
sure and proceduralized judicial review, then, NHTSA was forced
to adopt a cost-benefit methodology in setting standards, no mat-
ter what the 1966 Act said.
The agency's stalwart allies in Congress, especially on the
oversight committees, were outraged that the Council could control
NHTSA's rulemaking operations in this manner. But they were
also ineffective in opposing the Council. Senator Hartke, for exam-
ple, doggedly pursued the cost-benefit issue at Snow's nomination
hearing. Hartke's particular grievance was not so much the Coun-
cil's insinuation of cost-benefit considerations into rulemaking at
NHTSA, but the Administrator-designate's own predilections on
this issue. Hartke mounted a frontal attack on Snow's pre-hearing
statement that "we should rely on marketplace incentives to the
maximun extent appropriate." 3 The nominee, however, was both
unapologetic and unyielding.
Snow presumably was aware of the difficulty that Gregory had
encountered only weeks before in hearings before Representative
Moss's subcommittee on oversight and investigations. Gregory had
rested the legitimacy of cost-benefit methodology at NHTSA on
Executive Order 11,821 and had been lectured by Moss about the
precedence of congressional statutes over presidential orders . 4
Adroitly skirting those shoals, Snow made no mention of executive
orders, Coleman's new regulatory policies, or the Council on Wage
and Price Stability during his confirmation hearings. He explained
that the use of cost-benefit comparisons was a judicially-imposed
requirement. It derived from the courts' interpretation of the 1966
"I Id at 177 n 76.
12 Automotive Parts & Accessories Association v Boyd, 407 F2d 330.
83 Snow Nomination Hearings at 68-69 (cited in note 20).
"' Regulatory Reform Hearings at 448-49 (cited in note 53).
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Act's requirement that standards be "reasonable" and "practica-
ble." Snow elaborated:
I think those words "reasonable" and "practicable" carry
with them the connotation that the Administrator is to care-
fully analyze the alternatives available to him to advance the
safety objective. In that analysis, looking at the benefits and
looking at the costs, seem to me entirely appropriate.
In fact, as I read, I think it is the H & H Tire case in
DOT, and I have been reading a lot of cases-it is a brand
new field for me-as I read the H & H Tire case, the H & H
Tire case says that it is appropriate to use cost-benefit analy-
sis to help inform the decision. And the failure to take into
account effects of the standard on industry, the cost of the
standard, can fatally-fatally affect the judicial review of the
standards.8 5
Hartke's interrogation of Snow soon sputtered to an end.
Snow's appointment proved unstoppable; he was confirmed as
Administrator on July 1, 1976. For safety partisans in Congress
and elsewhere, however, there was a silver lining in the cloud cre-
ated by Snow's appointment. Only three months remained until
the Presidential election and public opinion polls revealed that
Gerald Ford's administration was in trouble. With any luck, the
safety partisans thought, Snow's tenure as Administrator would
merely be a momentary lapse before reinforcements would arrive
to reaffirm their conception of the original legislation. Snow, how-
ever, had other ideas.
As Snow scanned the regulatory landscape, his gaze fell upon
Order 800-1, which had put MVP in control of the rulemaking pro-
cess. He believed that the agency's proceedings on airbags and air
brakes were not models of efficient administrative action and rea-
soned that something must be wrong with NHTSA's rulemaking
process. By overhauling NHTSA's internal procedures for prepar-
ing rulemaking actions, Snow concluded, he could influence not
only pending actions but, perhaps, future policy as well. For help
in revising the 800-1 Order, Snow turned to Michael ("Why I Am
Losing My Hair") Finkelstein and Frank Berndt.
Senior staff meetings were held to consider alternative
rulemaking approaches. Over a winter weekend, Berndt, Finkel-
stein, and Snow hammered out the final revisions to the 800-1 Or-
" Snow Nomination Hearings at 72 (cited in note 20).
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der, which was formally issued on February 2, 1977.86 Finkelstein
later stated that the revised 800-1 Order had one overriding pur-
pose-to free the Administrator from the "captivity" of MVP.
87
The revised Order encompassed two complementary sets of re-
forms. The first was organizational; the Order redefined the role of
engineers in relation to program analysts and attorneys. The sec-
ond set of reforms was methodological; the Order emphasized the
importance of cost-benefit considerations in standard-setting. To-
gether, the reforms implemented an entirely new way of thinking
about and conducting rulemaking at NHTSA.
The revised Order abolished MVP's supremacy in the stan-
dard-setting process. It eliminated NHTSA's "Evaluation Panel,"
which MVP had dominated under the original Order. In its stead,
the revised Order implemented a seventeen step "flow chart proce-
dure" in which rulemaking responsibilities were widely dispersed
among engineers in MVP, policy and cost-benefit analysts in P &
P, and attorneys in OCC. More importantly, under the new 800-1
Order, engineers could seek, but not force, consensus on proposed
rules. While the original Order had empowered MVP unilaterally
to resolve differences with other offices, the revised Order required
that disputes be referred to the Administrator for resolution, and
explicitly stated that "unless a delegation is granted in a specific
area, the Administrator is responsible for establishing, amending,
or revoking vehicle safety and fuel economy standards .... .
In a memorandum accompanying the revised Order,8 Snow
made clear that program analysts in P & P and attorneys in OCC,
especially the former, were to exercise independent judgment and
to interrogate rulemaking engineers closely concerning the ratio-
nales for their proposals. The rulemaking process was intended to
be intensely iterative. The revised Order envisioned that MVP
would revise rulemaking support proposals in response to com-
ments from P & P and OCC, and that amended proposals would
be subject to further review and comment. The 800-1 Order thus
internalized a painstaking process of notice and comment/renotice
and recomment rulemaking, simply for formulation of proposals.
Publication in the Federal Register would commence a similar pro-
cess involving parties outside NHTSA.
86 NHTSA, Rev Order 800-1 (February 2, 1977) (on file with authors).
87 Personal interview with Michael M. Finkelstein (February 25, 1981).
"' Memorandum from Administrator to Distribution (February 2, 1977) (on file with
authors).
[57:443
HeinOnline -- 57 U. Chi. L. Rev.  470 1990
Inside the NHTSA
Carter was enraged by the new procedures. He was especially
incensed by the requirement of OCC concurrence on rulemaking
support papers. Berndt would not sign off on rulemaking proposals
until he was convinced, Carter later reported, that the supporting
data were invulnerable to court challenge. Because it is impossible
to eliminate the risk of losing in court, Carter believed that the
revised 800-1 Order amounted to a pact not to issue rules at all.8 9
V. THE ILLUSION OF 1966
On February 13, 1977-less than two weeks after the issuance
of the revised 800-1 Order-the new Secretary of Transportation,
Brock Adams, announced that President Carter had chosen Joan
Claybrook to head the agency. The contrast between Claybrook
and Snow was stark. Claybrook had impressive credentials as a
safety partisan. She was an ardent proponent of the airbag, and
had unique experience in auto safety regulation. As a legislative
assistant, Claybrook had participated in drafting the original
Safety Act, and she later served as a Special Assistant to William
Haddon, NHTSA's first administrator and the intellectual father
of the new science of accidents upon which that Act had been
predicated. She was a close associate of Ralph Nader, and in her
subsequent position as President of Congress Watch, had contin-
ued to press for auto safety programs. Few persons were more
knowledgeable or experienced in auto safety regulation or appar-
ently more committed to the revolution of 1966.
At times, Claybrook's testimony at her confirmation hearings
seemed to directly refute John Snow's fundamental commitments.
She emphasized, for example, that cost-benefit analysis was a very
"imperfect" rulemaking tool, in part because benefits could not be
fully measured and in part because its analytic methodology did
not adequately take account of distributive effects.9 Moreover,
Claybrook claimed that cost-benefit analysis was deficient because
it was "linear, not intermodal," meaning that "it balances costs of
a safety-improvement against its benefits, not against costly, frivo-
lous items with little or no benefit value." 91 Although her language
was different, her sentiments mirrored those of Senator Abe Ribi-
89 Personal interview with Robert L. Carter (June 9, 1987).
90 Nominations-March, Hearings Before the Senate Committee on Commerce, Joan
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coff, who called for the traffic safety hearings which led to the 1966
Act.
Claybrook also challenged Snow's reading of the case law. She
told Congress that cost-benefit analysis was not a statutory re-
quirement. A standard that cost more than the benefits it gener-
ated was lawful, she reasoned, even if issued without any analysis.
In H & H Tire, Claybrook explained, "The court did not state that
benefits of greater than unity must be shown to demonstrate 'eco-
nomic practicability.' " 2 Moreover, Claybrook pointed out, the
Sixth Circuit, in a footnote in Chrysler, had specifically found that
Congress did not require the benefits of safety rules to exceed their
costs. 93 Some of Claybrook's statements seemed to preview a re-
turn to the heyday of MVP power. Although defect modifications
and recalls were "very important," Claybrook testified, they were
"not as fundamental" as the promulgation and enforcement of
standards.94 Bob Carter, rejoice!
Now it was the industry's turn to be horrified. S. L. Terry,
Vice President for Consumer Affairs at Chrysler, described the
prospects of Claybrook's appointment as "appalling." 95 "She has
always been against the industry," he said in remarks to the press.
"It certainly does not seem to be an even handed appointment. I
would not expect that the Department of Transportation would
appoint an auto executive, but likewise I also wouldn't expect the
appointment of an industry critic or a Nader supporter." 9
A. A Power Lunch
Claybrook had been making plans to take command of
NHTSA even before her nomination was formally announced. In
January 1977, she had invited Frank Berndt to lunch at a restau-
rant on Capitol Hill. Their discussion set the tone for some of
Claybrook's early moves and innovations as Administrator.
97
Claybrook valued Berndt's advice, as her luncheon invitation
implied. Both were lawyers and, to a significant extent, both spoke
the same language. They viewed regulation in win-lose terms and
expected to be involved in heated contests with the industry.
92 Id at 9.
93 Id.; Chrysler Corp. v DOT, 472 F2d at 672 n. 6.
" Claybrook Nomination Hearings at 13.
91 Ernest Holsendolph, Lobbyist for Nader to Head Safety Unit, NY Times 12 (March
19, 1977).
96 Id.
97 Personal interview with Frank Berndt (June 2, 1987).
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Berndt's actions in court, moreover, had produced tangible results.
The recall program was an unqualified legal success. NHTSA was
winning every recall case and the per se defect theory had given
NHTSA great leverage in dealing with the manufactur-
ers-leverage now at Claybrook's disposal. NHTSA could impose
significant costs and reputational damage on recalcitrant manufac-
turers without a major expenditure of scarce agency resources. "I
have placed a powerful weapon in the Administrator's hands,"
Berndt later remarked, "and she's not afraid to use it." 98
Claybrook had a number of topics on her mind that day, in-
cluding the internal divisions among the agency's staff chronicled
by GAO in 1974. Claybrook knew that the conflict persisted. As the
luncheon conversation wore on, she posed a question that Frank
Berndt had been dwelling on for years: what should be done with
Robert Lee Carter? Claybrook knew that Berndt's success on re-
calls had come without much support from Bob Carter. She report-
edly believed that MVP's operation of the Office of Defects Inves-
tigation had been a disaster. In addition, Carter had made a mess
of things on the rulemaking side of the house. The principal catas-
trophes-the Chrysler decision, the Standard 121 debacle, and the
interlock episode-had occurred on Carter's watch. All were strate-
gically debilitating and politically embarrassing, as Claybrook well
understood. The agency could not afford similar reversals in the
future.
When Claybrook asked about Carter, Berndt had a ready an-
swer. He responded that MVP had acquired too much power under
Carter and should therefore be dismantled. Enforcement activities,
particularly the recall program, should be consolidated in a sepa-
rate unit, equal in stature to the rulemaking program, but report-
ing to different management. Rulemaking should also be more ef-
fectively supervised and focused. These suggestions had an explicit
or implicit corollary: the checks and balances embodied in the re-
vised 800-1 Order should be retained, whatever Claybrook's views
on the propriety of cost-benefit analysis.
Claybrook did not take immediate action on Berndt's grand
design, but within weeks of her arrival she moved to enhance
OCC's control over the recall program. She established a special
task force, composed wholly of lawyers, to clear out pending cases.
She placed Berndt in charge. Results quickly followed. NHTSA re-
called over twelve million vehicles in 1977, up from three million
"8 Personal interview with Frank Berndt (February 12, 1980).
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the year before. In 1978, the number totalled over nine million ve-
hicles. 9 NHTSA was recalling more vehicles than were coming off
the production lines.' 00
Tensions between Claybrook and Carter arose immediately
and mounted steadily. One senior agency official noted that there
was a "negative personal chemistry" between them.'0 ' Both had
strong personalities and clashes were inevitable. Carter obviously
did not share Claybrook's enthusiasm for confrontation by recall.
On one occasion, for example, he discreetly negotiated a settlement
with a manufacturer over a suspected defect. The manufacturer
agreed to fix the problem promptly, provided that it could do so
outside the glare of a high visibility recall campaign. Claybrook
was enraged over the deal that Carter had struck, and "chewed
him up one side and down the other.' 1 02 Claybrook was keeping
score with the industry over recalls. Carter had forfeited agency
points.
Claybrook, moreover, was her own associate administrator for
rulemaking. She worked long hours, enjoyed the detail of close
work, and was disinclined to delegate major decisions to Carter.
Besides, the decisionmaking forum for the agency's most impor-
tant initiatives-Standards 208 and 121-had by this time largely
shifted to Congress and the courts. The former legislative aid and
director of Nader's congressional project did not need Carter's help
in finding her way around the Hill. Moreover, Carter's connections
with safety constituencies outside the agency-which had so im-
pressed Mannella-were no match for Claybrook's long-standing
ties. As spring turned to summer, Carter grew even more frus-
trated with Claybrook's domination of programs. She ran the
agency more like a project officer than an Administrator, he
believed.
In the early winter of 1977, Claybrook acted on Berndt's pro-
posal to restructure NHTSA. Her reorganization took effect on
January 1, 1978, less than a year after their luncheon conversa-
Il NHTSA, Safety Related Recall Campaigns for Motor Vehicles and Motor Vehicle
Equipment, Including Tires, Dot H5-803-308 (1977 annual safety defect report); NHTSA,
Safety Related Recall Campaigns for Motor Vehicles and Motor Vehicle Equipment, Includ-
ing Tires, DOT H5-803-964 (1978 annual safety defect report).
100 U.S. passenger car production totalled 9.2 million vehicles in 1977. US Bureau of the
Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1985 595 ( GPO, 1985). Recalls of domes-
tic passenger vehicles totalled about 9.8 million that year. NHTSA, Safety Related Recall
Campaigns for Motor Vehicles and Motor Vehicle Equipment, Including Tires, DOT HS-
803-308 (1977 annual safety defect report).
10' Personal interview with Howard Dugoff (June 12, 1987).
102 Personal interview with Robert L. Carter (June 9, 1987).
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tion.10 3 Its purpose, Claybrook announced, was to "simplify the
agency's structure and to improve the quality of its decisionmaking
process."'1 4 In fact, however, the new organizational chart was in
some respects more complex than the old one. The principal fea-
ture of the reorganization, as Frank Berndt advocated, was the
separation of standard-setting from enforcement and investigation.
MVP was abolished. Two new staffs were established in its place:
one reporting to an Associate Administrator for Rulemaking, the
other to an Associate Administrator for Enforcement.
This, then, set the stage for personnel shifts that unmistaka-
bly told the story of the revised priorities at NHTSA. In March
1978, Michael M. Finkelstein, Snow's former right hand man and
chief cost-benefit analyst, was named Associate Administrator for
Rulemaking. His deputy, Barry Felrice (an alumnus of the Federal
Highway Administration), took charge of P & P. Berndt became
Associate Administrator for Enforcement. (After setting up this
new unit, he returned to his post as Chief Counsel.) Carter was
named director of the agency's test facility in East Liberty, Ohio.
James Hofferberth, Carter's principal rulemaking assistant, and
Andrew (No Defect) Detrick, head of the ODI, accompanied Carter
to NHTSA's version of Siberia.
B. The New Religion
These changes hardly silenced the discontented voices within
NHTSA. Remember that only two years after the Claybrook reor-
ganization, Finkelstein issued his February 1, 1980 ultimatum to
the rulemaking staff. The new Associate Administrator for
Rulemaking issued this memorandum in order to root out two mis-
conceptions that, he believed, were at the heart of his staff's re-
sentment of P & P and OCC. Finkelstein called the misconceptions
"the two principal myths in NHTSA" that arose every time OCC
and P & P delayed a rulemaking action in order to obtain more
information. 5 The first concerned the Rulemaking Plan, which
identified NHTSA's rulemaking priorities and had been issued
with great fanfare in 1978. It was the long awaited progeny of the
general Rulemaking Plan of October 1971. The second misconcep-
103 National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, Organization and Delegation of
Powers and Duties, 43 Fed Reg 8525 (March 2, 1978); NHTSA Reorganization Information
(undated mimeo) (on file with authors).
104 Id.
103 Memorandum from Associate Administrator for Rulemaking to All Rulemaking
Staff 2 (February 1, 1980) (on file with authors). See text at notes 13-16.
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tion dealt with Claybrook herself. Finkelstein described the myths
as follows:
"Myth I"
"It is in the RULEMAKING PLAN: (capitalizing denotes an item
demanding special reverence)."
'Myth II"
"JOAN wants it (see note above)."'1 6
The rulemaking staff, Finkelstein observed, "believed that the in-
vocation of either myth should be sufficient to terminate the
thought processes in P & P and OCC.'
10 7
Finkelstein proceeded to dethrone these false idols. He noted
that the rulemaking process was "a rigorous search" for "the best
approach to ameliorate a problem."'1 8 In preparing rules, he
stated, it was important for the rulemakers to consider as many
sources of information and perspectives as possible. A regulation
might be warranted, but then again, it might not, depending on the
results of the analysis and the iterative effort to validate assump-
tions. Finkelstein reminded his staff that "[i]t is the RULEMAK-
ING PROCESS that determines whether a regulation will be is-
sued, not the fact that it is included in the rulemaking plan."'0 9
His memorandum chided the engineers that they should be
"overjoyed" if the lawyers or analysts found reason to kill a rule
because that would spare the engineers a "never-ending" stream of
petitions by the regulated parties." 0
He dismissed the second myth even more curtly. Claybrook's
exhortations should not be misinterpreted, Finkelstein cautioned.
To be sure, the Administrator wanted rulemaking completed "as
quickly as possible," but she also wanted "the most intelligent
course of action followed.""' Finkelstein elaborated:
I want to emphasize as strongly as I can that the rulemaking
process is not a rubber stamp procedure designed to get out
regulations that have been divined by Claybrook, Finkelstein,
or anyone else. It is intended to produce reasonable solutions
to real problems as a result of the work of a large number of







112 Id at 3-4.
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Agency rulemaking was governed by the 800-1 Order, not by the
personalities of individual officials. Myths I and II accordingly
were "forbidden as heresies.""' 3
When Finkelstein issued his memorandum in 1980, Clay-
brook's new religion of auto safety was not producing a flood of
important new rules. The first two years of her administration
were devoted largely to Standard 208 and to the promulgation of
fuel economy rules, a task that Claybrook's deputy later character-
ized as "terribly diverting."" 4 When the Administrator sought to
press forward on other proposals in the second half of her term,
she learned about the difficulties of assigning an offensive mission
to a defensive team. The checks and balances of the rulemaking
process, coupled with the agency's responsibility to consider the
impact of its rules on the economy, the environment, small busi-
nesses, and urban communities, prevented it from preparing and
issuing rules expeditiously.
Not until the very end of her administration was Claybrook
able to issue in final form many of the proposals that had been
pending since her arrival. By then, however, times had changed.
The Reagan Administration had appointed new NHTSA leaders
who simply revoked Claybrook's eleventh hour rules before they
could take effect. They similarly dropped many pending propos-
als." 5 A strong pro-safety administration spent four years generat-
ing only one significant rulemaking product, the revised Standard
208.
These difficulties had, of course, not beset the recall program.
The Office of Plans and Programs occasionally urged the agency to
subject recalls to cost-benefit analysis, but that proposal made lit-
tle headway either during Claybrook's administration or thereafter.
Berndt brushed aside the proposal as unworthy of serious consid-
eration. Economists simply did not understand the law, he later
explained."
6
113 Id at 3.
" Personal interview with Howard Dugoff (June 12, 1987).
NHTSA Oversight, Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Surface Transportation
of the Senate Committee on Commerce, 97th Cong, 2d Sess 50-53 (1982) (statement of Clar-
ence Ditlow, Director, Center for Auto Safety) (during the first sixteen months of the Rea-
gan Administration, NHTSA rescinded or relaxed existing rules or terminated pending
rulemaking in nineteen instances, and proposed similar actions in twenty-one instances).
16 Personal interview with Frank Berndt (June 4, 1987).
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VI. THE INTERACTION OF LEGAL AND BUREAUCRATIC CULTURE
Berndt's comment about understanding the law is, in our view,
a fitting epitaph for NHTSA's rulemaking efforts in the 1970s.
Over the course of that decade, the law steadily reshaped the
agency's internal organization and procedures. "Proceduralized"
judicial review for rationality, combined with the demands of exec-
utive orders from three presidents, pressed NHTSA relentlessly to-
ward the defensive, checks and balances internal procedure for
proposing and acting on rulemakings. The agency, as a matter of
formal internal procedure, began to litigate with itself. Losses in
court stymied, embarrassed, and ultimately delegitimated the ef-
forts of the principal proponents of aggressive rulemaking. Mean-
while, the recall program's legal burdens were progressively re-
laxed. The legal successes of the enforcement personnel,
particularly Frank Berndt and OCC, lifted them to successively
higher plateaus of power within the agency.
The hallmarks of internal development at NHTSA during the
1970s were redeployment of personnel from rulemaking to enforce-
ment, restructuring of lines of authority in favor of the recall ef-
fort, and increased use of complex internal procedures that empha-
sized the cautionary propensity of lawyers and economists. Those
developments were undeniably shaped by factors other than the
external legal culture. Public demand was the moving force behind
the recall effort. Professional biases, bureaucratic ambitions, fiscal
constraints, personality conflicts, and simple chance all clearly
shaped the agency's structure, processes, and behavior. Yet, we are
struck by the degree to which the judiciary's legitimation or delegi-
timation of NHTSA's efforts channelled the currents and cross-
currents of other influences into a stream of ideas and arguments
and, ultimately, of internal processes and personnel decisions that
shifted NHTSA away from the vision of 1966. That vision was, af-
ter all, not without staunch, talented, and powerful defenders. By
all accounts, Bob Carter was technically well-qualified, a tough
competitor in the bureaucratic trenches, and politically astute
enough to build a solid network of external supporters. His staff of
safety engineers was committed to the rulemaking effort. More-
over, the congressional oversight committees constantly urged the
agency to get the rulemaking process moving. Had the courts rati-
fied Carter's efforts in Chrysler and in other crucial cases of the
early 1970s, while demanding that recalls be justified by demon-
strable effects on safety, Joan Claybrook might well have had her
winter luncheon with Bob Carter rather than Frank Berndt.
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Or, to take another example, John Snow and Bill Coleman
were committed to implementing the Nixon-Ford policy of thor-
ough assessment of the economic impact of regulations. But
NHTSA's engineering staff, the relevant congressional committees,
and Administrator Claybrook were not. As a result, NHTSA estab-
lished procedures that scrutinized its rulemaking proposals in
terms of their economic costs, benefits, and alternatives. The adop-
tion of these procedures was not a function of top-down executive
control; most other agencies found President Carter's regulatory
review machinery to be a modest irritation, not a binding con-
straint.117 This defensive posture was made necessary by legal re-
quirements. NHTSA felt compelled to explain to reviewing courts
why the cost-benefit criticisms of COWPS, and the cost, lead time
and "real world" effects arguments of manufacturers (and others)
did not undermine the "reasonableness" or "practicability" of the
agency's motor vehicle standards.
Much that went on inside NHTSA during the 1970s was unre-
lated to the biases of American legal culture. Nevertheless, the
NHTSA that entered the new decade was powerfully shaped by
the demands and the differential supports of the law.
117 Christopher C. DeMuth, Constraining Regulatory Costs - Part I: The White House
Review Programs, 4 Regulation 13, 17-18 (Jan/Feb 1980); and Christopher C. Demuth, Con-
straining Regulatory Costs - Part II: The Regulatory Budget, 4 Regulation 29 (March/April
1980).
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